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ARLINGTON HEIGHTS WON IN THE SUPREME COURT BUT 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT’S GOAL OF PROMOTING RACIAL 
INTEGRATION SAVED THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
Henry Rose* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, a developer sought a zoning change to a 
parcel of land in Arlington Heights, Illinois that would allow for the 
construction of low-income housing.  Arlington Heights denied the 
zoning change and the developer sued Arlington Heights arguing that 
this denial violated both equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the federal Fair 
Housing Act (“FHA”).  The case reached the United States Supreme 
Court on the equal protection issue and the Court held that the 
developer did not establish an equal protection violation because it 
failed to prove that a racially discriminatory purpose motivated 
Arlington Heights’ denial of the zoning change.  The Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the lower courts to consider the FHA claims.1 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the denial of the zoning change that the developer 
sought from Arlington Heights had the discriminatory effect of 
perpetuating residential racial segregation there, and unless the low-
income housing project could feasibly be built at another site in 
Arlington Heights, the denial of the zoning change constituted a 
violation of the FHA.2  After this decision by the Seventh Circuit, the 
parties entered into a consent decree in which Arlington Heights 
agreed to annex another parcel of land and allow the construction of 
 
* Curt and Linda Rodin Professor of Law and Social Justice, Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law. 
1 The case discussed in the paragraph came from Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
2 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert 
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
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the developer’s low-income housing project on it.3  The developer’s 
project was eventually built on the land that Arlington Heights 
annexed, and the low-income housing project opened to a diverse 
population of residents in 1983. 
The construction of the developer’s low-income housing 
project in Arlington Heights was facilitated by the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision that a denial of housing that has the discriminatory effect of 
perpetuating residential racial segregation violates the FHA even if a 
discriminatory purpose is not established.  In 2013, the federal 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) issued a 
rule that the FHA could be violated by, inter alia, housing decisions 
that have the discriminatory effect of perpetuating residential 
segregation.4  In 2015, the United States Supreme Court determined 
that a housing policy that has a disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities and otherwise lacks a legitimate rationale is cognizable 
under the FHA.5 
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in the Arlington Heights case is an important judicial 
precedent for using the FHA to challenge housing decisions that 
perpetuate housing segregation.  The article seeks to explain how the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision that Arlington Heights must accommodate 
the construction of low-income housing in order to comply with the 
FHA presages interpretations of the FHA by both HUD and the 
Supreme Court that occurred more than 35 years later.  These broad 
interpretations of the FHA create valuable tools to achieve one of the 
primary goals of the FHA—the residential integration of the races in 
the United States.  Finally, this article will address 2018 efforts by 
HUD to review its 2013 discriminatory effect rule in light of the 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision.  This article will examine whether 
HUD’s current regulatory review process should alter how the 
discriminatory effect standard involving the perpetuation of residential 
segregation will be applied in the future to determine whether the FHA 
has been violated. 
 
3 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
4 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg 
11460-501 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
5 Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
2
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE ARLINGTON HEIGHTS CASE 
A. Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois 
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, Illinois that is 
located approximately 26 miles northwest of Chicago’s downtown.6  
In 1970, the population of Arlington Heights was 64,884, of whom 27 
residents were black.7  Only 137 of the 13,000 persons who worked in 
Arlington Heights in 1970 were black and almost all of these 137 
blacks lived in Chicago.8  The northwest suburban townships of 
Chicago, of which Arlington Heights is a part, experienced a 
population increase of 219,000 people from 1960 to 1970 but only 170 
of the new residents were black.9  During the same time period, the 
proportion of the black population in the Chicago metropolitan area 
increased from 14% to 18%.10 
B. Clerics of St. Viator (Clerics) 
The Clerics of St. Viator (“Clerics”), a Catholic religious order, 
owned 80 acres of land in Arlington Heights on which they operated a 
novitiate and a high school.11  The Clerics’ 80 acre parcel of land was 
surrounded by single family homes.12  Most of the 80 acres were vacant 
land, and the Clerics decided in 1970 to devote some of this vacant 
land to low- and moderate-income housing.13 
C. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 
(MHDC) 
The Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 
(“MHDC”) is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that was created in 
1968 to develop low- and moderate-income housing in the Chicago 
metropolitan area.14  In 1970, the Clerics entered into an agreement to 
 
6 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255 (1977). 
7 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1286-87. 
8 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 414 n.2 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
9 Id. at 414. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 411. 
12 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255 (1977). 
13 Id. 
14 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d at 410-11. 
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sell 15 of their 80 acres to MHDC at the bargain price of $300,000, 
contingent upon MHDC securing a zoning change from Arlington 
Heights and obtaining financial assistance from the federal 
government to build subsidized housing that would be racially 
integrated.15  MHDC developed plans to build Lincoln Green, 20 two-
story buildings totaling 190 residential units with a mix of single 
bedroom and multiple bedroom units, on the 15 acre site.16 
D. Arlington Heights Zoning Law 
Most of the land in Arlington Heights was zoned for detached 
single family homes.17  The 80 acre parcel owned by the Clerics as well 
as all of the land bordering it was zoned R-3, limiting its use to single 
family homes.18  In order for Lincoln Green to be built by MHDC, the 
15 acres that MHDC bought from the Clerics needed to be rezoned R-
5, allowing for the construction of multifamily units.19  The 1959 
Comprehensive Plan of Arlington Heights provided that land should 
only be zoned R-5 as a buffer between single family homes and 
commercial, industrial or other high intensity uses.20  In the early 
1970s, there were 60 tracts of land in Arlington Heights that were 
zoned R-5 and some of them were vacant land.21  
MHDC applied to Arlington Heights for a zoning change from 
R-3 to R-5 for the 15 acre parcel it bought from the Clerics to allow 
for the construction of Lincoln Green there.22  MHDC worked with the 
Arlington Heights staff in a preliminary review process and every 
change recommended by the staff during these consultations was 
incorporated into the rezoning application that MHDC submitted to the 
Plan Commission.23  The Plan Commission considered MHDC’s 
rezoning application at three public meetings in the spring of 1971 that 
drew large crowds.24  The public comments at these meetings were 
 
15 Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 256-57. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 255. 
18 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d at 411.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 
1974). 
22 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d. at 411. 
23 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 257 (1977). 
24 Id. 
4
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mixed, but many of the persons who attended them were both 
demonstrative and vocal in opposition to Lincoln Green.25  At the 
conclusion of its third meeting, the Plan Commission recommended, 
with two members dissenting, that the 15 acre parcel was not an 
appropriate location for low- and moderate-income housing.26  On 
September 28, 1971, the Village Board met to consider MHDC’s 
rezoning application and the Plan Commission’s recommendation, and 
after hearing from the public, the Board voted 6-1 to deny MHDC’s 
rezoning application.27  
III. LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE DENIAL OF MHDC’S 
REZONING APPLICATION BY ARLINGTON HEIGHTS 
A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
In June 1972, MHDC and three black persons sued Arlington 
Heights and several village officials in federal court28 asserting that the 
denial of MHDC’s rezoning application violated their rights under: the 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983; the FHA, 42 
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.29  One black plaintiff, Mr. Ranson, worked in 
Arlington Heights but lived with his family approximately 20 miles 
away and alleged in the complaint that he would seek and qualify to 
live at Lincoln Green if it were built.30 
B. 1974 District Court Decision 
A district court judge conducted a trial on the merits of 
plaintiffs’ case and concluded on February 22, 1974 that a judgment 
should be entered in favor of Arlington Heights and the other 
defendants.31  The district court judge found that defendants had not 
violated plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights because the denial of 
the zoning change disadvantaged low-income persons, not merely 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 258. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 209 (N.D. Ill. 
1974). 
30 Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264. 
31 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 373 F. Supp. at 208-09. 
5
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blacks, and the denial was motivated by a desire to protect property 
values and the integrity of Arlington Heights’ zoning plan.32  The 
district court judge also ruled that no sections of the FHA “seem 
applicable to the facts of this case.”33 
C. 1975 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
The plaintiffs appealed the 1974 district court decision and the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals only considered whether Arlington 
Heights violated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights by denying 
MHDC’s rezoning request34 and did not address whether plaintiffs’ 
rights under the FHA were violated.35  The court recognized that a 
greater percentage of blacks than whites would be adversely affected 
by the denial of MHDC’s rezoning application by defendants because 
a greater percentage of blacks than whites would be financially eligible 
to live in Lincoln Green if it were constructed as planned.36  However, 
the court held that this racial disparity alone did not amount to racial 
discrimination.37  The court then considered that Arlington Heights had 
a small number of black residents (27 of 64,884 in 1970) and did not 
have any other existing or planned low-income housing developments 
and held that its rejection of the Lincoln Green proposal had the 
racially discriminatory effect of perpetuating residential racial 
segregation there.38  The court further held that Arlington Heights’ 
reasons for denying MHDC’s rezoning request—maintaining the 
integrity of its zoning plan and protecting neighboring property 
values—were not sufficiently compelling interests to justify this 
racially discriminatory effect, and, therefore, Arlington Heights 
violated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights when it denied the zoning 
change.39 
 
32 Id. at 210-11. 
33 Id. at 209. 
34 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 410-15 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
35 Id. at 411-15. 
36 Id. at 413. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 413-15. 
39 Id. at 415. 
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D. 1977 United States Supreme Court Decision 
The defendants appealed the 1975 Seventh Circuit decision, 
and the United States Supreme Court reversed it and held that proof of 
discriminatory purpose is required to prove racial discrimination under 
equal protection.40  The Court acknowledged that proof of a racially 
discriminatory effect can be circumstantial evidence of racially 
discriminatory purpose.41  However, the Court found that plaintiffs 
failed to prove that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor 
in the decision of Arlington Heights to deny MHDC’s request for a 
zoning change and, therefore, equal protection was not violated.42  The 
Court remanded the case to the lower courts to address plaintiffs’ 
claims under the FHA.43 
E. 1977 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
On remand, the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision initially noted 
that the Supreme Court had not reversed the holding in the 1975 
Seventh Circuit decision that the denial of the zoning change by 
Arlington Heights had the racially discriminatory effect of 
perpetuating racial segregation there.44  The court then focused on 
whether Arlington Heights had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the 
FHA which provides that “it shall be unlawful . . . to make unavailable 
or deny . . . a dwelling to a person because of race, color, religion or 
national origin.”45  The court held that a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(a) can be established by proof of racially discriminatory effect 
without proof of racially discriminatory intent, although conduct that 
shows such an effect is not necessarily a violation of 42 U.S.C § 
3604(a).46  Rather, whether conduct that causes such a discriminatory 
effect violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) depends upon: 
1. The strength of the discriminatory effect; 
2. Any evidence of discriminatory intent; 
 
40 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255, 265 (1977). 
41 Id. at 266. 
42 Id. at 265-71. 
43 Id. at 271. 
44 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
45 Id. at 1287. 
46 Id. at 1290. 
7
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3. Defendants’ interest in the conduct that produced 
the discriminatory effect; and 
4. Whether plaintiffs seek defendants to affirmatively 
provide housing for members of minority groups or 
to restrain defendants from interfering with 
property owners who wish to provide such 
housing.47  
After considering these four factors, the court concluded that 
since plaintiffs were seeking to effectuate the FHA’s goal of creating 
racially integrated housing, the denial of MHDC’s rezoning 
application by Arlington Heights would constitute a violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(a) if there was no other land in Arlington Heights that 
was both properly zoned and suitable for federally subsidized, low-
income housing.48  As a result, the case was remanded to the district 
court to determine whether such other land was available in Arlington 
Heights and, if not, to find that Arlington Heights’ denial of the zoning 
change that MHDC requested violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).49  
Defendants sought review of this 1977 decision of the Seventh Circuit 
in the United States Supreme Court but certiorari was denied.50 
F. 1979 District Court Decision 
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the 1977 
Seventh Circuit decision, the case was remanded to the district court 
for proceedings consistent with this decision of the Seventh Circuit.51  
The parties notified the district court judge that they had negotiated a 
consent decree that they presented to the court for consideration.52  The 
proposed consent decree provided that a slightly modified low-income 
housing development would be built by MHDC on a 20 acre, vacant 
parcel of currently unincorporated land located between Arlington 
Heights and the neighboring Village of Mount Prospect.53  Under the 
terms of the proposed consent decree, Arlington Heights would annex 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1290-94. 
49 Id. at 1294-95. 
50 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
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this land and would designate 12 acres of it as R-5 to allow for 
MHDC’s construction of low-income housing on it.54  The new 
development would include 190 total rental units, 109 units suitable 
for elderly persons and the remaining units suitable for families.55  
Mount Prospect, a few local civic organizations and several 
neighboring landowners were allowed to intervene in the case, and 
they all objected to the entry of the proposed consent decree.56  The 
court conducted three days of hearings on the intervenors’ objections 
to the consent decree, considered their objections and dismissed them 
because they were overridden by strong federal policies that favor open 
housing and the settlement of litigation.57  After the intervenors were 
dismissed from the case, the district judge entered the consent decree.58  
The intervenors appealed the entry of the consent decree to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the entry of the consent decree was 
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.59 
IV. LINDEN PLACE DEVELOPMENT 
Pursuant to the settlement of the litigation, MHDC broke 
ground in 1980 on the construction of a new low-income housing 
development called Linden Place on the land that Arlington Heights 
annexed.60  Linden Place opened for occupancy in 1983 with 109 units 
for senior citizens and 80 units for families.61  The first residents of 
Linden Place were approximately 60% white and the other residents 





54 Id. at 843, 870. 
55 Id. at 871. 
56 Id. at 836, 843-44, 847-48, 864-69. 
57 Id. at 836, 844-69. 
58 Id. at 869. 
59 Metro. Hous. Dev. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
60 Dori Meinert, Housing Accepted As Controversy Dies Down, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1983, 
ND17. 
61 Id. 
62 Steven Morris, Subsidized Housing a Boon For Many Suburbanites, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 
1984, W1. 
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FHA 
IN THE 1977 SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
After the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not established 
an equal protection violation because they failed to prove that 
defendants had acted with discriminatory purpose in denying MHDC’s 
rezoning request,63 the Supreme Court remanded the case to consider 
plaintiffs’ contention that the rezoning denial violated the FHA.64  The 
Seventh Circuit panel that considered the case on remand from the 
Supreme Court in 1977 initially recognized that the Supreme Court had 
not reversed the 1975 Seventh Circuit holding that the denial of 
rezoning by defendants had a racially discriminatory effect.65  
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit panel considering the case on remand 
in 1977 reaffirmed the 1975 Seventh Circuit holding that defendants’ 
denial of rezoning had the discriminatory effect of perpetuating racial 
residential segregation in Arlington Heights.66  The Seventh Circuit 
panel on remand then addressed whether a racially discriminatory 
effect, without proof of discriminatory intent, could violate the FHA.67  
The panel analyzed the history, language and purpose of the FHA and 
held that a discriminatory effect could constitute a violation of the 
FHA.68  The Seventh Circuit joined the Eighth Circuit in so holding.69 
Another significant aspect of the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision 
is how the court analyzed the discriminatory effect of defendants’ 
decision to deny MHDC’s rezoning request.  The court identified two 
types of racially discriminatory effects which a facially neutral 
decision about housing can produce.70  The first type of discriminatory 
effect occurs if the decision has a greater adverse impact on one racial 
group than on another.71  The second type of discriminatory effect 
occurs if the decision perpetuates racial segregation in a community 
 
63 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 
(1977). 
64 Id. at 271. 
65 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
66 Id. at 1288. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1288-90. 
69 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
70 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290. 
71 Id. 
10
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and thereby prevents interracial association among members of that 
community.72  The court found that in this case the first type of 
discriminatory effect was “relatively weak” because 60% of the 
persons in the Chicago area who were eligible for federally subsidized 
housing in 1970 were white.73  However, the court held that the second 
type of discriminatory effect would be established if there was no other 
land in Arlington Heights which could accommodate the construction 
of federally subsidized low-income housing because then the effect of 
the denial of MHDC’s request for rezoning would be to perpetuate 
residential racial segregation in Arlington Heights.74  If there was no 
such other land, the court held that defendants’ denial of MHDC’s 
rezoning request would constitute a violation of section 3604(a) of the 
FHA.75  The 1977 Seventh Circuit decision was the first federal court 
of appeals to hold that a housing decision that perpetuates residential 
racial segregation in a community can be the discriminatory effect that 
violates the FHA, independent of the decision’s effect on the racial 
groups protected by the FHA.76  
VI. HUD’S FHA DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS RULE 
In 2013, the Secretary of HUD issued a final rule promulgating 
its standards for determining when a neutral housing practice that has 
a discriminatory effect gives rise to liability under the FHA.77  Initially, 
HUD pointed out that like eleven federal courts of appeal (including 
the Seventh Circuit’s 1977 decision in the Arlington Heights case), it 
had long interpreted the FHA to prohibit housing practices with an 
 
72 Id.  The court cited Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) as 
support for this second type of discriminatory effect.  In Trafficante, the Supreme Court held 
that a black tenant and a white tenant in an apartment complex had standing under the FHA to 
challenge the apartment owner’s alleged racial discrimination against prospective tenants of 
the complex.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.  The Supreme Court in Trafficante emphasized that 
the FHA was designed to be applied broadly to promote the integration of the races and to 
protect communities from discriminatory housing practices that limit interracial association.  
Id. at 209-12. 
73 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1291. 
74 Id. at 1291-95. 
75 Id. at 1288, 1295. 
76 Id. at 1290, 1295.  
77 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11460-501 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
11
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unjustified discriminatory effect, regardless of whether there was an 
intent to discriminate.78 
The rule issued by HUD in 2013 defined discriminatory effect 
as a practice that actually or predictably results in a disparate impact 
on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates 
segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status or national origin.79  HUD included 
segregation-perpetuating practices in the definition of discriminatory 
effect because the “elimination of segregation is central to why the Fair 
Housing Act was enacted.”80  HUD recognized that the FHA was 
enacted to not only protect certain groups of persons from 
discrimination in housing decisions affecting them but also to protect 
entire communities from residential racial segregation.81  Thus, HUD’s 
2013 rule adopted the principle first developed in the 1977 Seventh 
Circuit decision in the Arlington Heights case that housing practices 
that have the effect of perpetuating racial residential segregation in a 
community are independently actionable under the FHA. 
The HUD 2013 rule did alter the FHA legal doctrine developed 
in the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision in one important way.  The 1977 
Seventh Circuit decision adopted a four-part balancing test for 
determining whether a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.82  
HUD’s 2013 rule establishes a three-part burden-shifting test for 
determining when a housing practice with a discriminatory effect 
violates the FHA: 1) the alleged victim of discrimination has the 
burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will 
cause a discriminatory effect (i.e., a prima facie case); 2) if a prima 
facie case is established, the alleged perpetrator of discrimination has 
the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to 
achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests; 3) if such an interest(s) is established, the alleged victim of 
discrimination may still prevail by proving that the interest(s) served 
by the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has 
a less discriminatory effect.83 
 
78 Id. at 11460, 11462 n.28. 
79 Id. at 11467-68, 11482 (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)). 
80 Id. at 11469. 
81 Id. 
82 Supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
83 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 11482 (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)). 
12
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HUD’s 2013 rule followed the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision 
in several important respects.  HUD accepted that a violation of the 
FHA could be proven by the discriminatory effect of a housing 
practice, even absent proof of discriminatory intent.  HUD also 
accepted the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision’s holding that a 
discriminatory effect under the FHA could include a housing practice 
that perpetuates racial residential segregation in a community, 
independent of the effect of the practice on the groups that are 
protected by the FHA.  HUD adopted a simplified burden-shifting test 
for establishing when a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.  
However, the four evidentiary factors that the 1977 Seventh Circuit 
decision identified as necessary to evaluate to determine whether a 
discriminatory effect violates the FHA84 are substantive sources of 
evidence that can be utilized to meet the burden of proof standards in 
HUD’s 2013 burden-shifting test.85 
VII. SUPREME COURT’S 2015 DECISION IN TEXAS DEPARTMENT 
OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY V. ICP 
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court definitively held that 
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.86  While the 
Court acknowledged HUD’s issuance of its 2013 rule interpreting the 
FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability,87 the Court did not cite 
HUD’s 2013 rule to support its holding.88  Rather, the key factors that 
supported the Court’s holding were the FHA’s statutory purpose, its 
results-oriented text, its 1988 amendments in light of the unanimous 
view of nine courts of appeal that disparate-impact liability is available 
under the FHA, and similar statutory language in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967.89  The Court acknowledged that government land use practices 
that exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods could violate the 
 
84 Supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
85 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 11482. 
86 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 
(2015). 
87 Id. at 2514. 
88 Id. at 2516-25. 
89 Id. at 2525. 
13
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FHA,90  citing two cases, United States v. City of Black Jack91 and 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of the Huntington,92 both of 
whose rationales for finding FHA violations included that the 
challenged housing practices perpetuated segregation in the affected 
communities.93 
The Court also recognized that prejudice is often unconscious 
and animus is often disguised and that disparate-impact liability 
prevents these factors from contributing to “segregated housing 
patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit 
stereotyping.”94  Finally, the Court was emphatic that the FHA should 
be interpreted to promote its “continuing role in moving the Nation 
toward a more integrated society.”95  
In holding that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under 
the FHA, the Court did note several limitations on its holding.  The 
Court cautioned that serious constitutional questions might arise if 
disparity-impact liability under the FHA was based solely on a 
statistical disparity.96  If evidence of statistical disparities are offered 
as proof of disparate impact, it must be established that the disparities 
are caused by a policy of the alleged perpetrator of discrimination.97  If 
a housing discrimination claim based on a disparate-implicit liability 
is brought, the alleged perpetrator must also be able to present a valid 
interest served by the challenged policy as a defense to the 
discrimination claim.  Finally, the Court cautioned against race being 
applied as a quota in a disparate-impact context because this would 
implicate constitutional issues and would frustrate efforts to develop 
race-neutral solutions to housing problems.98 
VIII. RECONSIDERATION OF HUD’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FAIR HOUSING ACT’S DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD 
In June 2018, HUD announced that it intended to consider 
possible amendments to HUD’s 2013 rule implementing the FHA’s 
 
90 Id. at 2521-22. 
91 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
92 844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1988), judgment aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
93 City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186; Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 937-38. 
94 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
95 Id. at 2525-26. 
96 Id. at 2522. 
97 Id. at 2522-24. 
98 Id. at 2523-25. 
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disparate impact standard.99  HUD is reviewing the 2013 rule to 
determine if it should be revised in light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision in Texas Department of Housing and 
Community v. ICP.100 
It is unlikely that HUD will disturb the perpetuation-of-
segregation basis of discriminatory effect liability under the FHA 
embodied in its 2013 rule101 because the Supreme Court in its 2015 
decision recognized that one of the primary purposes of the FHA is to 
combat residential segregation in the Nation.102  The perpetuation-of-
segregation basis of discriminatory effect liability under the FHA has 
been successful at challenging zoning or other actions of local 
governments that block the construction of affordable housing 
developments.103  In its 2015 decision, the Supreme Court described 
suits that target such local governmental practices as the “heartland of 
disparate-impact liability” under the FHA.104  Any efforts by HUD to 
undermine perpetuation-of-segregation claims as a basis for disparate-
impact liability under the FHA would be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision. 
The limitations included in the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision 
about the application of disparate-impact liability under the FHA105 
apply to perpetuation-of-segregation claims.106  How these limitations 
would apply to a perpetuation-of-segregation claim like the Arlington 
Heights case can be examined in the context of HUD’s current three-
part burden-shifting test for determining when a housing practice with 
a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.107 
Part 1.  The alleged victim of discrimination has the burden of 
proving that a practice of the alleged perpetrator of discrimination 
caused a segregated housing pattern to be created, increased, 
reinforced or perpetuated.108  A limitation on disparate-impact liability 
 
99 Reconsideration of HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 28560-601 (June 20, 2018). 
100 Id. at 28560. 
101 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)). 
102 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2525-26. 
103 Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 709, 749-50 (2017). 
104 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2521-22. 
105 Supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.  
106 Schwemm, supra note 103, at 728-29. 
107 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2019). 
108 Id. § 100.500(a), (c)(1). 
15
Rose: Arlington Heights and the FHA
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
806 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
under the FHA imposed by the Supreme Court that applies here is that 
a disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity should fail 
if the plaintiff cannot identify an alleged perpetrator’s policy that 
caused the disparity.109  Thus, the Supreme Court emphasized that an 
alleged perpetrator’s policy must cause residential segregation to be 
perpetuated in the affected community. 
In the Arlington Heights case, all of the elements necessary for 
plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof at part one existed.  The 1977 
Seventh Circuit decision relied on population statistics to establish that 
Arlington Heights was a racially segregated community—in 1970, it 
had a population of 64,884 of whom only 27 were black.110  MHDC’s 
planned low-income housing development would have reduced racial 
segregation in Arlington Heights because it was to be subsidized by 
the federal government which required the development to be racially 
integrated.111  When Arlington Heights denied MHDC’s rezoning 
request, the effect was to perpetuate segregation in Arlington 
Heights.112 
A policy of Arlington Heights was at the heart of its denial of 
MHDC’s rezoning request.  MHDC’s rezoning request was denied 
because it would violate Arlington Heights’ land use policy of only 
allowing R-5 (multi-family housing) zoning as a buffer between single 
family homes and commercial, industrial and other high intensity 
uses.113  The land that MHDC sought to rezone to R-5 was surrounded 
by single family homes114 and to rezone it would have violated 
Arlington Heights’ R-5 buffer policy. 
Finally, the 2015 Supreme Court decision requires that the 
implementation of the alleged perpetrator’s policy must cause the 
perpetuation-of-segregation effect.115  HUD’s current regulation 
involving discriminatory effects under the FHA includes the causation 
requirement.116  In the 1977 Seventh Circuit decision, the court found 
that Arlington Heights’ decision to deny MHDC’s zoning request “had 
 
109 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
110 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
114 Supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
115 Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 
(2015). 
116 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2019). 
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the effect of perpetuating segregation in Arlington Heights.”117  The 
Seventh Circuit found causation so MHDC and the other plaintiffs 
could have established what is now described as a “prima facie case”118 
at part one of the burden-shifting process used by HUD to determine 
whether a discriminatory effect violates the FHA. 
Part 2.  If the alleged victim of discrimination proves a prima 
facie case at part one, the alleged perpetrator of discrimination must 
prove at part two that its policy is necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.119  This part is 
consistent with the limitation in the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision 
that alleged perpetrators of discrimination must be given “leeway to 
state and explain the valid interest served by their policies.”120  
In the Arlington Heights case, defendants could likely prove 
that the buffer policy in Arlington Heights’ land use laws that was the 
reason for the denial of MHDC’s rezoning request121 was a substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest that met their burden of proof at 
part two.  None of the courts that considered the Arlington Heights 
case questioned whether Arlington Heights’ R-5 buffer policy was a 
legitimate land use policy. 
Part 3.  If the alleged perpetrator of discrimination meets its 
burden of proof at part two, the alleged victim of discrimination must 
prove at part three that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interest proved in part two could be served by another practice that has 
a less discriminatory effect.122  Part three is analogous to the provision 
of the Title VII statute that a party complaining of alleged employment 
discrimination on a disparate-impact theory of liability can rebut an 
employer’s defense to an employment discrimination charge by 
proving that an alternative employment practice exists that would 
eliminate the disparate impact.123  
In the Arlington Heights case, the 1977 Seventh Circuit 
decision explored alternatives to building MHDC’s low-income 
housing project at sites other than the one for which it sought rezoning 
that would not violate Arlington Height’s buffer zone policy for 
 
117 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288. 
118 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11460 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
119 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2). 
120 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
121 Supra notes 20, 113-14 and accompanying text. 
122 20 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3). 
123 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). 
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locating multifamily housing.124  The court remanded the case to the 
district court to require Arlington Heights to identify any other such 
sites that are both zoned R-5 and are suitable for federally-subsidized, 
low-income housing.125  After the case was remanded by the Seventh 
Circuit in 1977, the parties settled the case in the district court agreeing 
to an alternative site for MHDC’s housing development.126  Pursuant 
to the settlement, MHDC developed its federally-subsidized, low-
income housing development at an alternative site in Arlington 
Heights, and it opened for occupancy in 1983 to a diverse population 
of residents.127  Thus, MHDC and Arlington Heights were able to agree 
on an alternative site for MHDC’s low-income housing development 
that was both consistent with Arlington Heights’ R-5 buffer policy and 
achieved MHDC’s and the FHA’s goal of reducing residential 
segregation in Arlington Heights.  As a result, the Arlington Heights 
case would have been actionable under HUD’s 2013 rule for 
determining disparate impact liability under the FHA while honoring 
the limitations imposed on such liability by the Supreme Court in its 
2015 decision. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The protracted litigation between MHDC and Arlington 
Heights resulted in several significant legal decisions.  The Supreme 
Court held that residential racial discrimination only violates equal 
protection if it is purposeful.  On remand from the Supreme Court, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized disparate-impact liability under the FHA 
and held that a housing decision that perpetuates residential racial 
segregation in a community is the type of discriminatory effect that can 
be actionable under the FHA even absent discriminatory purpose.  The 
Seventh Circuit also recognized that the FHA has dual purposes to 
prevent discrimination on the basis of race and other protected 
characteristics and to avoid the perpetuation of racial residential 
segregation in American communities.  Maintaining the perpetuation-
of-segregation theory of disparate-impact liability under the FHA is 
consistent with both HUD’s 2013 rule and the Supreme Court’s 2015 
 
124 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291-95 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
125 Id. at 1294-95. 
126 Supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. 
127 Supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
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decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community v. ICP.  Its 
application in the Arlington Heights case resulted in the construction 
of an integrated housing development that furthered one of the primary 
purposes of the FHA—the promotion of the residential integration of 
the races in the United States. 
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